This paper studies the complexity of solving two classes of non-cooperative games in a distributed manner in which the players communicate with a set of system nodes over noisy communication channels. The complexity of solving each game class is defined as the minimum number of iterations required to find a Nash equilibrium (NE) of any game in that class with ǫ accuracy. First, we consider the class G of all N -player non-cooperative games with a continuous action space that admit at least one NE. Using information-theoretic inequalities, we derive a lower bound on the complexity of solving G that depends on the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set and the total capacity of the communication channels. We also derive a lower bound on the complexity of solving games in G which depends on the volume and surface area of the constraint set. We next consider the class of all N -player non-cooperative games with at least one NE such that the players' utility functions satisfy a certain (differential) constraint. We derive lower bounds on the complexity of solving this game class under both Gaussian and nonGaussian noise models. Our result in the non-Gaussian case is derived by establishing a connection between the Kullback-Leibler distance and Fisher information.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Motivation
Game theory offers a suite of analytical frameworks for investigating the interaction between rational decision-makers, hereafter called players. In the past decade, game theory has found diverse applications across engineering disciplines ranging from power control in wireless networks to modeling the behavior of travelers in a transport system. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the fundamental solution concept for non-cooperative games, in which a number of players compete to maximize conflicting utility functions that are influenced by the action of others. At the NE, no player benefits from a unilateral deviation from its NE strategy.
Finding the NE of a non-cooperative game is a fundamental research problem that lies at the heart of game theory literature. For non-cooperative games with continuous action spaces, various Nash seeking algorithms have been proposed in the literature, e.g. see [1] , [2] . In this paper, we investigate the intrinsic difficulty of finding a NE in such games. Using the notion of complexity from the convex optimization literature, and information-theoretic inequalities, we derive lower bounds on the minimum number of iterations required to find a NE within a desired accuracy, for any N -player, non-cooperative game in a given class.
B. Related Work
The book by [3] pioneered the investigation of complexity in convex optimization problems. In this model, an algorithm sequentially queries an oracle about the objective function of a convex optimization problem, and the oracle responds according to the queries and the objective function. They derive bounds on the minimum number of queries required to find the global optimizer of any function in a given function class. In [4] , information-theoretic lower bounds were derived on the complexity of convex optimization problems with a stochastic first order oracle for the class of functions with a known Lipschitz constant. In a stochastic first order oracle model, the algorithm receives randomized information about the objective function and its subgradient. These results were extended to different function classes in [5] .
The paper [6] considered a model in which the algorithm observes noisy versions of the oracle's response and established lower bounds on the complexity of convex optimization problems under first order as well as gradient-only oracles. In [7] , complexity lower bounds were obtained for convex optimization problems with a stochastic zero-order oracle. The paper [8] studied the complexity of convex optimization problems under a zero-order stochastic oracle in which the optimization algorithm submits two queries at each iteration and the oracle responds to both queries. These results were extended to the case in which the algorithm makes queries about multiple points at each iteration in [9] . In [10] , the complexity of convex optimization problems was studied under an erroneous oracle model wherein the oracle's responses to queries are subject to absolute/relative errors. 
C. Contributions
This paper studies the complexity of solving two classes of non-cooperative games in a distributed setting in which players communicate, not with an oracle, but with a set of utility system nodes (USNs) and constraint system nodes (CSNs) to obtain the required information for updating their actions. Each USN computes the utility-related information for a subset of players whereas a CSN evaluates a subset of constraint functions. The communication between players and system nodes is subject to noise, i.e., the system nodes will receive noisy versions of players' actions, and the players will receive noisy information from the system nodes.
First, we consider the game class G which consists of all N -player non-cooperative games with a joint action space defined by L convex constraints such that all the games in G admit at least one Nash equilibrium (NE). We derive lower bounds on the minimum number of iterations required to get within ǫ of a NE of any game in G with confidence 1 − δ without imposing any particular structure on the computation model at USNs. Our results indicate that the complexity of solving the game class G is limited by the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set and the total capacity of communication channels from the USNs to the players. We also derive a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G in terms of the volume and surface area of the constraint set. We note that, in a precursor conference paper [11] , we have studied the complexity of solving the game class G under a slightly different setting than that in the current manuscript.
We next consider the game class G γ which consists of all non-cooperative games with a joint action space defined by L constraints such that (i) all the games in G γ admit at least one NE, (ii) the norm of the Jacobian matrix of the pseudo-gradient vector, induced by utility functions of players, is more than γ. We study the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model at USNs and various noise models. Under the partial-derivative computation model, each player receives a noisy version of the partial derivative of its utility function, with respect to its action, in each iteration.
Our results show that the complexity of solving the game class G γ up to ǫ accuracy is at least of order 1 γ 2 ǫ 2 , as ǫ tends to zero, with Gaussian communication channels. We also consider a setting in which the channels from system nodes to players are non-Gaussian and the channels from players to system nodes are noiseless. In the non-Gaussian setting, our results show that the complexity of solving the game class G γ up to ǫ accuracy is at least of order 1 γ 2 ǫ 2 as ǫ tends to zero. This result is established by deriving an asymptotic expansion for the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between a non-Gaussian probability distribution function (PDF) and its shifted version, under some mild assumptions on the non-Gaussian PDF. More precisely, it is shown that the KL distance between a PDF and its shifted version can be written, up an error term, as a monomial which is quadratic in the shift parameter and linear in the Fisher information of the corresponding PDF with respect to the shift parameter.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses our modeling assumptions and problem formulation. Section III discusses our main results along with their interpretations. All the proofs are relegated to Section IV to improve the readability of the paper. Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Game-theoretic Set-up
Consider a non-cooperative game with N players indexed over N = {1, · · · , N }. Let x i (i ∈ N ), and
denote the action of the ith player and the collection of all players' actions, respectively. The utility function of the ith player is denoted by u i x i , x −i where x −i is the vector of those other players' actions that affect the ith player's utility. The utility function of the ith player quantifies the desirability of any point in the action space for the ith player. The actions of players are limited by L convex constraints denoted by g (x) ≤ 0 where
⊤ is a mapping from R N to R L . The set of constraint functions is indexed over L = {p ∈ N : 1 ≤ p ≤ L}. Let S denote the action space of players, i.e.,
We assume that S is a compact and convex subset of R N .
In non-cooperative games, each player is interested in maximizing its own utility function, irrespective of other players. Since the maximizers of utility functions of players do not necessarily coincide with each other, a trade-off is required. In this paper, the Nash equilibrium is considered as the canonical solution concept of the non-cooperative game among players. Let x NE ∈ S be the NE of the game among players. Then, at the NE, no player has incentive to unilaterally deviate its action from its NE strategy, i.e.,
NE,C is the collection of NE strategies of players which are coupled with the ith player through constraints, and S x −i NE,C is the set of possible actions of the ith player given x −i NE,C . The vector of all utility functions is denoted by
that player. Let A be such a Nash seeking algorithm. Then, under A, the ith player's action at time k, i.e., x i k , is updated according to the update rule
where X 
, , respectively, where x i t is the action of the ith player at time t,ŷ i t denotes the received utility-related information by the ith player at time t andẑ i,p t denotes the received information regarding the pth constraint by the ith player at time t. The kth step of the algorithm A is denoted by
.
We refer to
as the Nash seeking algorithm A.
2) Communication and Computation At USNs:
The received action of the ith player by USN l at time k, i.e.,x i k,usn l , can be written asx
is the noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to USN l . LetX
denote the history of actions received by USN l from time 1 to time k. At time k, USN l computes y i k , i.e., the utility-related information for player i at time k, for all i such that π (i) = l.
In this paper, we study the complexity of solving non-cooperative games under two computation models at USNs. We first consider a general computation model in which y i k is allowed to be any arbitrary function of u i (·) and the information available at USN l from time 1 to k, i.e.,
where O k,i (·, ·) is a functional. This formulation allows us to capture the complexity of solving the game class G under a general class of computation models at USNs in Theorem 1. We refer to
as the general computation model at USNs. We also study the complexity of solving non-cooperative games under the partial-derivative computation model in which USN l at time k evaluates the partial derivative of the utility function of the ith player with respect to its action, i.e., y
for all i with π (i) = l. We refer to the partial-derivative computational model for USNs as
whereX
: i ∈ N usn l denotes the set of actions received by USN l at time k and
Then, USN l transmits y i k to the ith player for all i with π (i) = l. The received utility-related information by the ith player at time k can be written asŷ
k is the noise in the downlink channel from the USN π(i) to the ith player.
3) Communication and Computation At CSNs:
The received action of the ith player by CSN n at time k, i.e,x i k,csnn , can be written asx
where W i k,csnn is the noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to CSN n . The collection of received actions at time k by the CSN n is denoted byX csnn k = x i k,csnn : i ∈ N csnn . At time k, CSN n evaluates its associated constraint functions using the received actions at time k, i.e.,
Finally, CSN n broadcasts z p k to the players which their actions affect g p (·). If the action of the ith player affects the pth constraint, the ith player will receiveẑ
is the noise in the downlink channel from CSN φ(p) to the player i.
Remark 1: Although, we assume that the CSN n at time k transmits g p X csnn k to the ith player (if p ∈ L i ), our results continue to hold when other computation models are implemented at the CSNs, e.g., when the CSN n at time k transmits
to the ith player. The set of constraints which are affected by the ith player action USN π(i) The USN which computes utility-related information for the ith player CSN φ(p) The CSN which evaluates the pth constraint N usn l
The set of players which transmit their actions to USN l N csn n The set of players which transmit their actions to CSN n x i k Action of the ith player at time k X The history of received constraint-related information by the ith players from time 1 to k Z 1:k
The history of received constraint-related information by all the players from time
The additive noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to USN l at time
The additive noise in the uplink channel from the ith player to CSN n at time
The additive noise in the downlink channel from USN π(i) to the ith player at time k V i,p k
The additive noise in the downlink channel which transmits z p k to the ith player at time k (p ∈ L i )
E. Modeling Assumptions
In this paper, we impose the following assumptions on the Nash seeking algorithms and the noise terms in the uplink/downlink communication channels:
1) X 1 is specified by the algorithm A, and the algorithm A uses the same value of X 1 for solving any game.
is a collection of zero mean, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with 
F. Organization of The Paper and Notations
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section III states our main results on the complexity of solving two classes of non-cooperative games. Section IV presents the derivation of our results, and Section V concludes the paper.
In the rest of this paper, we use the following notations from asymptotic analysis literature. For two positive functions f (x) and g (x), we say
g(x) < ∞. Our main notations are summarized in Table I. III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS In this section, we establish various lower bounds on the complexity of solving two game classes under different assumptions on the distribution of uplink/downlink noise terms and different computation models at USNs. In Subsection III-A, we derive two lower bounds on the complexity of solving the game class G under the general computation model at USNs without assuming any particular distribution for the uplink/downlink noise terms. In Subsection III-B, we establish a lower bound on the complexity of solving a subclass of G, denoted by G γ , under Gaussian uplink/downlink channels and the partial-derivative computation model. Subsection III-B presents a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G γ under noiseless uplink channels, non-Gaussian downlink channels, and the partial-derivative computation model. Subsection III-D discusses the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model when both uplink and downlink channels are non-Gaussian distributed.
A. General Computation model at USNs and General Uplink/Downlink Channels
In this subsection, we study the computational complexity of solving the game class G without imposing any particular structure on the computation model at the USNs, or imposing any specific probability distribution on the noise in the uplink/downlink channels. To this end, we first give the definition of the total capacity of downlink channels, the notion of 2ǫ-distinguishable subsets of S, and the Kolmogorov capacity of S.
The total capacity of downlink channels from USNs to players is defined as
where y i andŷ i are the input and the output of the downlink channel from USN π(i) to the ith player, respectively, Y =
is the joint distribution of Y , and α is the total average power constraint of the downlink channels between USNs and players.
where C down is the total capacity downlink channels from USNs to players, and log M 2ǫ (S) is the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the action space S.
Proof: See Subsection IV-A. Theorem 1 establishes an algorithm-independent lower bound on the order of complexity of solving the game class G. According to this theorem, T ⋆ ǫ,δ (G, O) is lower bounded by the ratio of the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of the action space S to the total Shannon capacity of the downlink channels. Note that the Kolmogorov 2ǫ-capacity of S can be interpreted as a measure of players' ambiguity about their NE strategies. Thus, as log M 2ǫ (S) becomes large, T ⋆ ǫ,δ (G, O) is expected to increase since players have to search in a bigger space to find their NE strategies. Based on Theorem 1, C down has a reverse impact on T ⋆ ǫ,δ (G, O). Note that C down is an indication of the information transmission quality from USNs to players. That is, as C down decreases, players will receive noisier information regarding their utility functions compared with a large value of C down .
Theorem 1 depends on the 2ǫ-capacity of the constraint set S which is usually hard to compute unless the action space of players is restricted to special geometries. As M 2ǫ (S) is just the maximum number of ǫ-balls that can be packed into S, it is asymptotically equal to
αN ǫ N as ǫ tends to zero, where B ǫ is the N -ball of radius ǫ, and α N is the N -dimensional spherical constant under the assumed norm. Thus, the complexity is at least of order log 1 ǫ as ǫ becomes small. The next result establishes a non-asymptotic lower bound of the same order, by lower bounding M 2ǫ (S) using a result from lattice theory.
Corollary 1: The complexity of solving the class of N -player non-cooperative games G with continuous action space S can be bower bounded as
where Vol (S) and P (S) are the volume and the surface area of the action space of players, respectively. Proof: See Subsection IV-B. Based on Corollary 1, the lower bound on T ⋆ ǫ,δ (G, O) increases at least linearly with the number of players. This is due to the fact that the amount of uncertainty about the NE increases as the number of players becomes large. Recall that log M 2ǫ (S) is a quantitative indicator of ambiguity about the NE. Furthermore, ǫ has a logarithmic effect on T ⋆ ǫ,δ (G, O), i.e., the complexity of solving the class of games G increases according to Ω log 1 ǫ as ǫ becomes small. Hence, based on Corollary 1, the game class G cannot be solved faster than Θ log 1 ǫ time-steps regardless of uplink/downlink noise distributions, and the computation model at the USNs.
According to Corollary 1, the lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G increases as the volume of the action space of players becomes large. Also, for a given surface area of action space of players, i.e., P (S), the volume of action space of players can be upper bounded using the isoperimetric inequality for convex bodies [14] as follows:
where B is the closed unit ball in N -dimensional Euclidean space R N . Note that the equality in (6) is achieved if and only if S is a ball in R N [14] . Thus, for a given surface area of action space of players P (S), the lower bound on the complexity of solving games in the class G increases as the action space of players becomes closer to a ball in R N with the volume 
B. Partial-derivative Computation Model at USNs and Gaussian Uplink/Downlink Channels
In this section, we establish a lower bound on the complexity of solving a subclass of G, denoted by G γ , under the partialderivative computation model (see equation (3)) when the communication noise in the uplink and downlink channels is Gaussian distributed. We also compare the complexity of solving the game class G γ with the complexity of solving the class of strongly convex optimization problems. To specify the game class G γ , we first define the notion of pseudo-gradient for a utility function vector as follows.
Definition 3: The pseudo-gradient of the utility function vector
We use J∇ U (x) to denote the Jacobian matrix of the vector valued function∇U (x), i.e.,
We next specify a set of utility vector functions, denoted by F γ , which is used to define the game class G γ .
Definition 4:
The set of utility vector functions F γ is defined as the set of all vector valued functions U (x) from R N to R N such that
1) The N -player non-cooperative game with utility vector function given by U (x) and the constraint set S admits at least a Nash equilibrium (NE).
2) The matrix J∇ U (x) exists for all x in S.
3) The matrix J∇ U (x) satisfies J∇ U(x) ≥ γ > 0 for all x ∈ S where J∇ U (x) denotes the matrix norm of J∇
The next definition specifies the game class G γ .
Definition 5: The class of games G γ = N , S, F γ is defined as the set of all non-cooperative games with N players, the constraint set S, and the utility function vector U (·) in F γ .
Note that the game class G γ reduces to the class G when γ is equal to zero. The complexity of solving the game class G γ heavily depends on J∇ U (x) as shown in Theorem 2.
Remark 3: We note that both∇U (x) and J∇ U (x) play important roles in the game theory and system theory literature. To clarify this point, consider an unconstrained N -player game with the utility vector function
Then, any solution of∇ U (x) = 0 will be a NE of this game. Also, consider the dynamical systemẋ =∇U (x). Then, any NE of the aforementioned game will be an equilibrium of this dynamical system and the eigenvalues of the matrix J∇ U (x) determine the local stability of this dynamical system around its equilibria. Moreover, the matrix J∇ U (x) can be used to study the uniqueness of the NE in non-cooperative games [15] .
The next theorem studies the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model and Gaussian distributed uplink/downlink channels. In the derivation of Theorem 2, it is assumed that the constraint set S contains a 2-ball with radius √ 2ǫ, i.e., the set of all points in a 2-dimensional plane with the distance √ 2ǫ from a point in S.
1 denote the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model at USNs. Then, for Gaussian distributed uplink/downlink channels and δ ≤ 0.5, we have
where σ 2 i is the variance of noise at the player i's receiver. Proof: See Subsection IV-C. Theorem 2 establishes an algorithm-independent lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G γ . According to this result, the game class G γ cannot be solved faster than Θ 1 γ 2 ǫ 2 under the partial-derivative computation model and Gaussian noise model for uplink and downlink channels.
It is helpful to compare the complexity of solving the game class G γ with that of solving a black-box convex optimization problem. The complexity of solving black-box optimization problems is studied under an oracle-based setting in which optimization algorithms rely on an oracle for function evaluation. In this setting, the oracle receives noise-free queries from the optimization algorithm, and, the algorithm receives a noisy version of oracle's response [6] . The next corollary studies the complexity of solving the game class G γ in a similar setting, i.e., under noiseless uplink channels and Gaussian downlink channels.
Corollary 2: Let T ⋆ ǫ,δ G γ , O 1 denote the complexity of solving the class G γ using the partial-derivative computation model. Then, for noiseless uplink channels, Gaussian distributed downlink channels and δ ≤ 0.5, we have
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and is skipped. Next, we use Corollary 2 to compare the complexity of solving the class G γ with the complexity of solving a class of convex optimization problems using the oracle-based setting. To this end, consider the following optimization problem
where S is a convex set, and f (x) belongs to the class of continuous and strongly convex functions F sc . The complexity of solving the class of convex optimization problems with the objective function in F sc is defined as [6] inf T ∈ N : ∃A s.t. sup
where x T +1 is the output of the algorithm A after T queries, and f ⋆ = inf x∈S f (x). It is shown in [6] that the complexity of solving the class of strictly convex optimization problems under the subgradient computation model and Gaussian noise model is given by Ω 1 ǫ . According to the Corollary 2, the game class G γ is harder to solve compared with the class of strictly convex optimization problems since the games are non-convex problems, and NE is more sophisticated solution concept compared with the minimizer of a convex function (see Remark 2 for more details).
C. Partial-derivative Computation Model at USNs, Non-Gaussian Downlink Channels and Noiseless Uplink Channels
In this subsection, we study the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model when the downlink channels are not necessarily Gaussian and the uplink channels are noiseless. To this end, let p V i (x) denote the common probability distribution function (PDF) of the collection of random variables V i k k , i.e., the collection of noise terms in the downlink channel from USN π(i) to player i. To investigate the complexity of the game class G γ in the non-Gaussian setting, we assume that p V i (x) satisfies the following mild assumptions for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N 1) The PDF p V i (x) is non-zero everywhere on R.
2) The PDF p V i (x) is at least 3 times continuously differentiable, i.e., p V i (x) ∈ C 3 . 3) There exist positive constants β 1 , β 2 , β 3 > 0 such that
4) The tail of the random variable V i k decays faster than x −(β3+1) , i.e., we have
for some r > 0. The next theorem derives a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G γ in the non-Gaussian setting.
Theorem 3: Let T ⋆ ǫ,δ G γ , O 1 denote the complexity of solving the N -player non-cooperative games in the class G γ using the partial-derivative computation model at USNs. Assume that the PDFs of the downlink noise terms satisfy the assumptions 1-4 above and the uplink channels are noiseless. Then, for δ ≤ 0.5 we have
where I i is the Fisher information of the PDF p V i (x) with respect to a shift parameter.
Proof: See Subsection IV-D. Theorem 3 establishes a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G γ under noiseless uplink channels and non-Gaussian downlink channels. In Corollary 2, we showed that the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model is at least of the order 1 γ 2 ǫ 2 , as ǫ becomes small, when the uplink channels are noiseless and the downlink channels are Gaussian distributed. According to Theorem 3, the lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G γ is also of the order 1 γ 2 ǫ 2 when the uplink channels are noiseless and the downlink channels are not necessarily Gaussian distributed. Theorem 3 is established by deriving an asymptotic expansion for the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the PDF p V i (x) and its shifted version. More precisely, we show that
where A i is a 1-by-N row vector, τ is an N -by-1 column vector, p Aiτ +V i (x) is the PDF of A i τ + V i , and I i is the Fisher information of p V i (x) with respect to a shift parameter. Since the Taylor series of a real function is not necessarily convergent, Theorem 3 is proved using Taylor expansion Theorem. The assumptions 1-4 above are used to bound the remainder integral which appears in the Taylor expansion (see Lemma 6 in Subsection IV-D and its proof for more details).
D. Partial-derivative Computation Model at USNs With Arbitrarily Distributed Uplink and Downlink Channels
The next theorem establishes a lower bound on the complexity of solving the game class G γ under the partial-derivative computation model when the uplink and downlink channels are not necessarily Gaussian distributed.
Theorem 4:
The complexity of solving the game class G γ using the partial-derivative computation model at USNs is lower bounded by
where S 2ǫ is a 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S, A = [a ij ] is an N -by-N symmetric, negative definite matrix, x ⋆ M is a random vector taking value in S 2ǫ with uniform distribution, the random vectorŴ
is defined aŝ . Let F ′ be the finite set of utility function vectors defined as
Clearly, we have |F ′ | = M 2ǫ (S). The next lemma shows that the utility function vector U m (x) belongs to the function class F , i.e., the class of vector-valued functions from R N to R N such that any N -player non-cooperative game with the constraint set S and utility function vector in F admits at least one NE.
Lemma 1: Consider the N -player non-cooperative game in which: (i) the utility function of the ith player is given by
(ii) the action space of players is given by S. Then, x ⋆ m is a NE of the game among players, and we have U m (x) ∈ F .
Proof: To prove this result, we first show that x ⋆ m is the NE of the unconstrained, N -player non-cooperative game with the utility function vector U m (x) as follows. Consider the non-cooperative game in which the utility function of player i is given by u m,i x i , x −i . Then, the best response of the ith player to x −i is obtained by solving the following optimization problem:
where
Note that a ii < 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ N as the matrix A is negative definite. Thus, the objective function in (12) is strongly concave in x i and the optimization problem (12) admits a unique solution. The best response of player i to x −i can be obtained using the first order necessary and sufficient optimality condition:
Note that any intersection of the best responses of players is a NE. Thus, the NE of the unconstrained game can be found by solving the following system of linear equations
It can be easily verified that x ⋆ m is a solution of (13) which implies x ⋆ m is a NE of the N -player, unconstrained non-cooperative game with the utility function vector U m (x). Since x ⋆ m belongs to S, it is also a NE of the N -player, non-cooperative game with the utility function vector U m (x) and the action space S. Thus, U m (·) belongs to the function class F .
Lemma 1 implies that F ′ is a subset of F . We refer to the class of N -player non-cooperative games with the utility function vectors in F ′ and the action space S as G ′ = N , S, F ′ . Here, we make the technical assumption that each game in the game class G ′ admits a unique NE. This assumption can be satisfied by imposing more structure on the constraint set S, e.g., see [15] . In this paper, we do not explicitly impose a specific requirement on the action space S to guarantee the uniqueness of NE for the games in G ′ since these restrictions are only sufficient conditions (not necessary and sufficient) to guarantee the existence of a unique NE. Now, for a given ǫ and δ, consider any algorithm A for which after T time-steps, we have
Since F ′ is a subset of F and any game in G ′ admits a unique NE, we have
which completes the proof. We next use Fano inequality to obtain a lower bound on Pr (E A ). To this end, let the random variable M ∈ {1, · · · , M 2ǫ (S)} encode the choice of utility function vector from the set F ′ . Also, let the random variableM ∈ {1, · · · , M 2ǫ (S)} encode the estimated NE by genie. Then, using Fano inequality [16] , we have
where (a) follow from the fact that
Using (14), (17) and Lemma 2, we have
Next, we obtain an upper bound on I M ;M using information theoretic inequalities. 
3) Applying information theoretic inequalities:
Using the chain rule for mutual information, I M ; X 1:T ,Ŷ 1:T ,Ẑ 1:T can be expanded as
is the collection of players' actions at time k,Ŷ k = ŷ
is the collection of all received utility-related information by players at time k, andẐ k = ẑ
is the collection of all constraint-related information received by players at time k where L i is the set of constraints affected by the ith player's action.
Using the chain rule for conditional mutual information, we have
. Thus, 
is the collection of utility-related information computed by the USNs at time k. Using the definition of conditional mutual information, we have
which is independent of
It is straight forward to verify that random variables
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces entropy. Combining (21)- (24), we have
Combining (18), (19) and (25), we have
which completes the proof.
B. Proof of Corollary 1
Let D be a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries equal to 2ǫ. Let D be the lattice DZ N , i.e., D = Dz, z ∈ Z N . Note that the elements of D are at least 2ǫ apart. Let |D ∩ S| be the number of lattice points of D which lie in S. Clearly, M 2ǫ (S) is lower bounded by |D ∩ S|. We use the following result from [17] to obtain a lower bound on |D ∩ S| in terms of ǫ, volume and surface area of S.
Lemma 3: [17] Let D be a lattice in R N with non-zero determinant, i.e., Det (D) = 0. Let S be a convex and compact subset of R N . Then, we have
where Vol (S) is the volume of S, P (S) is the surface area of S and λ N (D) is the successive minima of D defined as the smallest ρ such that there exist N linearly independent elements of lattice,
For the lattice D = DZ N , we have Det (D) = (2ǫ) N and λ N (D) = 2ǫ. Thus, M 2ǫ (S) can be lower bounded as
is the ith row of A. It is straight forward to verify that x ⋆ m is a NE of the N -player non-cooperative game with the utility function vector U m (x) and the constraint set S (see the proof of Lemma 1 in Subsection IV-A). Let and U M (·) ∈ F ′ denote the NE and the utility function vector associated with the randomly selected game instance, respectively, where M is a random variable uniformly distributed over the set {1, · · · , 4}. Also, let the random variableM = {1, · · · , 4} encode the outcome of the genie-aided hypothesis test in Subsection IV-A. Then, using Lemma 2, Fano inequality and the fact that |S ⋆ 2ǫ | = 4, we have
Using (21) in Subsection IV-A, we have
Under the partial-derivative computation model for USNs, y i k can be written as
Thus,ŷ i k can be written asŷ
The covariance of the ith and tth entries ofŴ A can be written as
0 Otherwise where δ [·] denotes the Kronecker delta function, and A i is the ith row of A. Using the definition of the matrix G, we have 
= max 
D. Proof of Theorem 3
Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we first restrict our analysis to a finite subset of F γ . To this end, let S ⋆ 2ǫ and F ′ γ denote the 2ǫ-distinguishable subset of S and the finite subset of F γ , respectively, constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. For a given ǫ and δ < capacity of the communication channels which convey utility-related information to players. We also studied the complexity of solving a subclass of G under both Gaussian and non-Gaussian noise models.
